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 In 2016, the U.S. Federal government procured goods and services totaling $460 billion, 
or over two percent of America’s gross domestic product. Innovation is a key goal of Federal 
procurements, but the extent to which the acquisition process cultivates private-sector innovation 
is unclear. To shed light on this relationship, we explore private-sector innovation over an eight-
year period and find that firms increase research and development commeasurate with 
government contracts. We develop a measure that ranks firms on the intensity of public-sector 
versus private-sector innovation.  Tests deploying this tool show that firms with the most (least) 
research and development on government (relative to private) contracts produce innovative 
goods such as missiles (security guards). Taken together, our results suggest that Federal 
acquisitions appear to motivate innovation at levels that are appropriate to the nature of 
requisitioned goods or services. These results should be of interest to practitioners and 
acquisition personnel who serve a common goal of efficiently deploying a finite pool of 
taxpayer-generated revenues to the most productive use.  
  






“Government’s most profound and innovative technological breakthroughs…have resulted 
from strategic partnerships between agencies [and] private institutions…Building off of past 
successes and expanding these types of partnerships is vital for increasing the government’s 
collaboration and innovation, and addressing the nation’s most pressing challenges.”1 
 
 In 2016, the United States Federal government procured over $450 billion of goods and 
services.2 Federal procurement exceeded two percent of the nation’s gross domestic product, 
making the government the largest buyer in the nation. Because of its size, the government 
enjoys unrivaled bargaining power with its suppliers, also known as contractors. In addition to 
being a major customer of many suppliers, Uncle Sam is also firms’ most powerful customer; he 
employs auditors to monitor firms’ performance on contracts and can reclaim monies previously 
disbursed.3 Given the government’s unequaled bargaining power, they are in a unique position to 
incentivize private-sector innovation in novel technologies, goods, and services. However, the 
extent to which Federal acquisitions successfully achieve their objective of cultivating 
innovation remains unclear. We explore this question and find that private-sector partners 
increase investment in innovation with the extent of governement business. However, we are 
unable to conclude whether the impact of acquisitions on firm-level innovation (which we proxy 
using research and development expense) differs from the effect of private sales on firm-level 
research and development (where private sales are the firm’s sales to non-government 
customers).  
 
We extend the work of scholars who study customers’ influence on supplier innovation. 




2 See www.usaspending.gov. 
3 The Federal government maintains its own agencies dedicated to auditing contractors’ performance and adherence 
to the government’s billing standards, known as the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). In addition to reclaiming 
revenues, the government can bar the firm from further work if Federal contract audits identify material issues. For 
more information on CAS and contract audits, see https://www.acquisition.gov/far/html/FARTOCP30.html and 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-331T. 




capital for innovation (e.g., Patatoukas 2011). Consistent with firms investing excess capital in 
innovation, Krolikowski and Yuan (2017) find that firms do more research and development 
(R&D) work and have more patent citations when their business partners have strong bargaining 
power.4  Both Patatoukas and Krowlikowski and Yuan study private-sector customers of 
publicly-traded firms. As we noted above, the government enjoys privileges that are not 
available to private-sector buyers; because of the government’s unusual power, it is unclear if 
prior results generalize to the public procurement setting. Additionally, investing in innovative 
technologies to meet our nation’s strategic challenges is an important objective of acquition 
activity. Therefore, we find it worthwhile to explore the extent to which the government achieves 
this goal.  
 
 We also extend several recent studies that find a positive association between 
characteristics of the procurement environment and firm-specific outcomes. For example, Ferraz 
et al. (2015) find that winning at least one government contract increases the growth of Brazilian 
firms and motivates such firms to bid on additional contracts and expand into new product 
markets. Slavtchev and Wiederhold (2016) model returns to innovation as a function of 
government purchasing and find that private-sector returns to innovation increase with the extent 
of high-tech goods the government purchases; they conclude that procurement incentivizes 
private-sector firms to increase their innovation as the government demands more proprietary 
goods and services. Clemens and Rogers (2020) expand the relationship between characteristics 
of the government’s purchasing and innovation and find that the government’s demand function 
affects incentives to innovate, including incentives to trade off cost verus quality. Finally, 
Brogaard et al. (2016) and Decarolis et al. (2019) find that the extent and success of patent 
activity increases with government contracts. Taken together, recent research indicates that the 
contracting process incentivizes private-sector behavior and outcomes.  
 
We extend this stream of literature in several ways. Firstly, we find an average, cross-
sectional positive association between the extent of engagement with the government, measured 
by the firm’s government sales, on their ex ante investment in innovation, measured using R&D 
 
4	Krolikowski and Yuan (2017) also report that supply chain holdups reduce the benefits of customer concentration 
on innovation. 




expense. Patent activity captures the ex post success of innovation but does not speak to the 
firm’s incentive to innovate. In contrast, R&D spending measures the firm’s decision to innovate 
contemporaneous with receiving government contracts, so proxying innovaton with R&D 
provides cleaner evidence on the extent to which the government purchases innovation through 
the procurement process.5 
  
 Secondly, we provide evidence on the intensity of innovation on government relative to 
non-government (or private) sales. To measure relative innovation via R&D, we create a 
measure of the relative intensity of research and development on government versus private 
sales.  Our measure allows us to rank firms and industries on the relative importance of 
government to private-sector innovation. We validate our measure by showing that those firms 
with the highest (lowest) rank sell the government high tech (low tech) products such as missile 
systems (fuel).  Similarly, we rank three-digit North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) industries and find that industries with the highest (lowest) ratio of government to 
private research and development manufacture products such as missile systems (kidney 
dialysis).  To the best of our knowledge, our measure is new and we foresee broad applicability 
for scholars who need to rank firms or industries based on the relative intensity of various 
activities.  Our results should also be of interest to acquisition practitioners, one of whose key 
responsibilities is efficiently allocating taxpayer-generated revenues to the most productive use.  
 
2.0 Overview of Government Contracting and Hypothesis 
 
It is critical to understand government procurement (the process through which the Federal 
government obtains goods and services) in order to understand the potential impact of this 
process on firms’ incentives to innovate. Our summary draws heavily from Hermis (2020), who 
provides a more detailed explanation of government contracting. The procurement process 
begins when a government agency identifies a needed good or service, known as a requirement. 
The agency issues a formal document, called a request for proposal, which contains a detailed 
explanation of the government’s need and instructions for how firms should submit their 
 
5 Our results, derived from archival data, are necessary but not sufficient to establish causality. We cannot say 
government sales cause innovation, but our results are the first step toward proving causality. 




responses, which are known as contractor proposals. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
and supplemental agency-specific rules legislate the government’s procurement activities, 
including providing guidance on making award decisions.6 The average contract is awarded 
based on a combination of factors which may include the bidder’s technical knowledge (for 
example, experience providing similar items to other customers), history of successfully working 
for the government, and price. Of course, technical expertise, history with the government, and 
price vary in importance depending on the contract.7   
 
The government purchases a wide array of items. While agencies like the Department of 
Defense procure specialized goods such as proprietary weapons systems, they also purchase 
commodities (including toilet paper, laptop computers, and coffee). The extent to which the 
contracting firm innovates on the contract is obviously contingent on the nature of the 
government’s need. We would expect Raytheon, who builds missiles, to invest heavily in 
innovation, but we would be surprised (albeit, pleasantly) if OfficeMax displayed exuberant 
innovativeness in its provision of pens and pencils. The extent to which the average contractor 
invests in innovation likely reflects whether the government purchases more fighter jets or more 
packages of socks. Even holding constant what the government purchases, firms have different 
incentives to innovate. For example, firms who shift costs from private (commercial) to public-
sector contracts may innovate more as they engage further with the government because the 
government subsidizes their commercial work (e.g., Chen and Gunny 2015). However, these 
same firms plausibly have incentives to shirk if government oversight is lax, leading to a 
potential negative association between government sales and research and development. Ex ante, 
we are agnostic as to whether doing business with the Federal government is associated with 
higher or lower levels of firm-specific investment in research and development, which leads us 
to state our first hypothesis in the null form. 
 
H1: There is no association between the extent of the firm’s sales to the Federal 
government and the firm’s investment in innovation.  
 
6 See http://farsite.hill.af.mil/hierarchy.htm for codification of the FAR. 
7 To clarify our understanding of the procurement process, we spoke with a former Contracting Officer for the 
Department of Defense as well as a retired employee with contracting experience at several publicly- and privately-
held defense contractors.  





 Even if we find a statistically significant association between the extent of the firm’s 
government business and its innovation as measured by R&D spending, such a result would 
naturally raise the question regarding whether non-government sales similarly impact R&D 
spending. That is, for a given increase in government sales, what is the impact on R&D relative 
to the same increase in private sales? For the reasons described above, it is ex ante uncertain 
whether government contracts will lead to increased or decreased innovation relative to 
commercial sales with non-government customers. We state our second hypothesis as follow: 
 
H2:  There is no difference in the firm’s innovation for government relative to private, 
non-government sales.  
 
 We now turn to the research design. 
3.0 Research Design 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
 In order to test our hypotheses about the effect of government contracting on firm 
innovation, we compiled a sample of government contractors and comparable non-contractors 
with financial statement data sufficient to create a robust set of controls. We relied on two 
databases to identify such firms: the Compustat Fundamentals Annual file found in WRDS and 
usaspending.gov.8 We selected a sample period beginning in 2009 to avoid mixing observations 
prior to the 2008 fiscal crisis with those from the post-crisis period, and we ended our sample 
period in 2016 to allow a sufficient time lag for firms’ financial statement information to be 
uploaded to Compustat. Table 1 Panel A describes the sample selection and Panel B of the same 
table displays the number of observations per year, split into the contractor and non-contractor 
observations. 
 
8 Usaspending.gov is a repository of Federal spending activity.  Usaspending.gov pulls government contract award 
data on a daily basis from the Federal Procurement Data System Next Generation. Federal agencies submit contract 
award data at least twice monthly to be published on usaspending, and contract award data is linked directly from 
the agency’s financial system to usaspending’s awards data quarterly. Each agency’s senior accountable official 
certifies the quarterly data. Federal agencies are required to report contract awards within 30 days, with the 
exception of the Department of Defense, who reports awards within 90 days. The longer award reporting window is 
designed to protect national security. For more details on how usaspending.gov aggregates and verifies data, see 
https://www.usaspending.gov/#/about. 
 




 Our model requires substantial information about control variables and we began our 
sample creation by downloading the full Compustat Fundamentals Annual File pertaining to our 
sample period. After dropping duplicates and observations missing control and lagged control 
variable data, we were left with a sample of 28,065 unique firm-years between 2009 and 2016.  
Let us call this dataset A. 
 
 To identify government contractor firms, we first downloaded all Federal contract prime 
awards from usaspending.gov during the sample period. On average, each year of 
usaspending.gov data contained about four million unique contract awards.9 After eliminating 
duplicate contracts and contracts missing the recipient contractor name, the contract award 
amount, or the year in which the contract was awarded, we had a sample of approximately three 
million unique contractor-years between 2009 and 2016. Let us call this dataset B. 
 
 We intersected observations with full Compustat data (dataset A) with observations with 
government contractor data (dataset B) to create the government contractor dataset, which we 
will call dataset C.  The contractor firms consist of 2,248 firm-year observations from 714 
unique firms.  
  
We then generated a set of private sector control firms in several steps.  Removing all 
government contractor firms from dataset A generated an initial set of 25,817 observations on 
firms with only private sector sales.  We then used propensity score matching, described in 
greater detail in section 3.3, to reduce the set of control firms to 1,737 observations from 1,159 
unique firms. These control firms are called dataset D. Our final sample combines contractor 
dataset C and private sector control firm dataset D.  
    
Table 1 about here 
 
3.2 Model specification  
 
9We collected prime contract awards but not sub-contract awards to better answer how direct interactions between 
the firm and government impact firm-level innovation.  




 To test our first hypothesis that government contracts are unassociated with firm 
innovation, we begin with the model of Brown et al. (2009), who find that innovation (proxied 
using R&D) is a function of sales, cash, and prior investment in innovation. We also chose R&D 
as our measure of innovation and extend their model by separating total sales into government 
sales (GovSales) and non-government (or private sector) sales (PrivSales).10 Brown et al’s 
parsimonious model omits factors correlated with the firm’s lifecyle stage and characteristics of 
the Federal procurement process, so we augment their empirical specification by adding controls 
for the firm’s age, presence in a high tech industry, market valuation, and a series of year 
dummies (Year). As in Brown et. al, we log continuous variables to normalize the distribution, 
leading to our main model: 
 
LogR&Di,t = b0 + b1 Agei,t +b2 HiTechi,t + b3 LogMVEi,t + b4LagLogR&Di,t-1 + 
b5(LagLogR&Di,t-1)^2  + b6LogCashi,t + b7LagLogCashi,t-1 + b8LogGovSalesi,t + 
b9LagLogGovSalesi,t-1 + b10LogPrivSalesi,t + b11LagLogPrivSalesi,t-1 + 
b12Year10 + …  +  b18Year16 + ei,t         (1) 
 
 
where i indicates the firm, t indicates the year, and e is a normally-distributed disturbance 
term with a mean of zero. 
 
We include lagged R&D and contemporaneous and lagged sales and operating cash flows  
(scaled by size) because Brown et al. document that these variables predict current levels of 
innovation. We include a control for the firm’s age (Age, measured as the number of years since 
the firm first appeared in Compustat) to capture the higher bargaining power and efficiencies of 
scale to investment enjoyed by older firms. We identify firms in high tech industries with a 
dummy variable because such firms are ex ante more likely to engage in innovation by nature of 
their operating environment (Slavtchev and Wiederhold 2016). We specify HiTech as being 
equal to one if the firm falls in high technology three-digit NAICS codes as specified by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2016); zero otherwise.  The firm’s market value of equity, MVE, 
 
10 We chose R&D in lieu of patent information because we wished to measure the association between government 
contracts and ex ante innovation; patent activity captures the ex post success of innovation. 




captures the firm’s lifecycle stage and any associated competitive advantages or informational 
efficiencies. We measure the market value of equity as the number of common shares 
outstanding multiplied by price, all scaled by total assets. For contractors, GovSales is the firm’s 
sales from usaspending.gov scaled by total sales from Compustat, while PrivSales is the 
difference between Compustat sales and GovSales, scaled by total sales. For non-contractors, we 
set GovSales equal to zero and equate PrivSales to total sales scaled by total assets. Finally, Year 
is a series of dummy variables intended to capture time variation that applies to all firms in a 
given year. Continuous variables are logged to normalize their distribtion, where the log 
transformation is (natural logarithm of one plus the variable), and we use robust standard errorss. 
Appendix A contains the definitions of all variables.11 
 
3.3 Creation of control firms by propensity score matching. 
 If contractor and non-contractor firms systematically differ, this omitted variation may 
drive our empirical results. We used propensity score matching (PSM) to create an improved set 
of control observations that matches the contractor sample on observed and unobserved 
characteristics. PSM has a long history in accounting research and is appropriate when 
observations share predictable but unobservable group variation that may bias estimators if left 
untreated (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2010, Shimpman et al. 2017).  We executed the PSM as follows. 
 We ran a year-by-year logistic regression of a contractor dummy on all of the control 
variables in equation (1), with the exception of GovSales, which we can only observe for 
contractors. We then used each year’s fitted model to generate a propensity score for every firm-
year observation.  We matched each contractor observation with the control (non-contractor) 
observation with the closest propensity score using replacement.  Our final sample consists of 
2,248 contractor firm-year observations matched with 1,737 non-contractor firm-years. 
 As a check on the quality of the matching, we pooled all yearly data into one sample and 
re-ran the original logistic regression.  Given the way the sample was constructed, this new 
 
11 An anonymous referee rightfully noted that doing business with a large, powerful government agency and 
working on development contracts share a strong theoretical link to contemporaneous firm innovation. 
Usaspending.gov reports both awarding agency and codes that allow researchers to identify development type 
contracts. Unfortunately, these are contract-level variables that exhibit no within variation in our firm-year level 
analyses. In lieu of controls for large agency and development contracts, we executed sensitivity analyses with firm 
fixed effects which, arguably, should capture both of these underlying constructs. These results are discussed in 
section 4.0. 




logistic regression should have a poor fit.  Table 2 presents the results.  The low chi^2 probility 
(p=0.0446) indicates that we have a reasonable control sample.  
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
4.0 Results  
4.1 Testing hypotheses 1 and 2 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the contractor and non-contractor samples; all 
variables in Table 3 are unlogged to facilitate interpretation. Panel A compares the contractor 
and non-contractor firms, while Panel B reports on GovSales for only the contractor firms. Both 
contractor and non-contractor firms display skewness in R&D, Cash, MVE, and sales values 
(GovSales and PrivSales).  The skewness of key variables supports our decision to log 
continuous controls in our specification of model (1) to ensure that extreme observations are not 
contaminating our results and clouding our inferences.   
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 To test our first hypothesis, we estimate the OLS regression specified in equation (1) for 
the full sample of 3,985 firm-years and report the results in Table 4 Panel A. The coefficients on 
LogGovSales and LogPrivSales are both positive and significant (coefficients=0.0747 and 
0.1213, p-values=0.000 and 0.000, respectively), indicating that both government and private 
sales are associated with contemporaneously positive levels of R&D spending. Interestingly, the 
lags of both government and private sales (LagLogGovSales and LagLogPrivSales) are negative 
and significant (coefficients=-0.0836 and -0.1128, p-values=0.000 and 0.000, respectively), 
implying that last year’s sales to both government and private customers are associated with 
lower investment in innovation in the current year. A one-percent increase in government sales 
in the full sample is associated with a 7.5% increase in R&D, rendering the impact of 
government contracting on innovation both positive and economically meaningful. Taken 




together, these results allow us to reject the null hypothesis that government contracts are 
unassociated with firm-specific innovation.  
 
Other significant coefficients in Panel A of Table 4 include HiTech (coefficient=0.0073, p-
value=0.025), LagLogR&D (coefficient=0.8314, p-value=0.000), LogCash (coefficient=-0.0865, 
p-value=0.000), and LagLogCash (coefficient=0.0485, p-value=0.000). The significance of these 
coefficients implies that being in a high-tech industry and high levels of prior R&D spending are 
positively associated with current innovation. Unsurprisingly, lagged cash levels (LagLogCash) 
are positively associated with subsequent R&D one year ahead; in contrast, current cash levels 
(LogCash) are negatively associated with the dependent variable. 
 
After observing that government sales encourage innovation, we naturally wonder whether 
this effect differs from that of private sales. In other words, we surmise from Panel A of Table 4 
that R&D increases significantly for every one percent increase in government contracts, but we 
do not know if the magnitude of the increase is different from a one percent increase in private 
sector sales.12 To answer this query and provide evidence for our second hypothesis, we do an F-
test for the primary regression (Table 4 Panel A) on the null hypothesis that LogGovSales  = 
LogPrivSales; Panel B of Table 4 contains the results. As we can see, we can confidently reject 
the null hypothesis that government and private contracts have an equal impact on firm 
innovation (p = 0.0009). While a one percent increase in government sales is associated with a 
7.5 percent increase in R&D, the same magnitude increase in private sales contemporaneously 
increases R&D spending by 12.1 percent.  We interpret Panels A and B of Table 4 as providing 
evidence that contracting with the Federal government encourages firms to innovate by investing 
in R&D, but the extent to which government contracts incentivize this innovation is less than the 
incentives provided by private (non-government) contracts. The mechanism through which 
government contracts promote innovation remains an open empirical question; in section 5.0, we 
examine the cross-sectional variation in government and commercial R&D spending to help 
illuminate this issue. Before proceeding to these tests, let us discuss the robustness of the primary 
result reported in Table 4.  
 
12 Greene (2000) and Woolridge (2012) demonstrate that the estimated logarithmic coefficients are cross-elasticities.   





Table 4 about here 
 
4.2 Sensitivity tests 
 
 If contractors systematically differ from non-contractors on unobservable factors 
correlated with the propensity to innovate and the probability of receiving a government contract 
(such as the firm’s bargaining power), it is possible that the results in Table 4 are driven by 
correlated omitted variables. To help mitigate this possibility, we estimate an extension of 
equation (1) that includes firm fixed effects. As we can see from the results reported in Table 5 
Panel A, LogGovSales remains statiscally significant and shares the same directional association 
with the dependent variable as previously documented (coefficient=0.0766, p-value=0.000).  
LogPrivSales also remains positive and significant (coefficient=0.0963, p-value=0.000). Given 
that firm-level financial controls such as government sales are fixed within a given year, the 
inclusion of firm fixed effects likely absorbs some of the variation in which we are interested, 
particularly in LogGovSales and  LogPrivSales. The strength of these coefficients in Table 5 
Panel A likely represents a conservative estimate of the effect of government contracts on firms’ 
innovation, providing greater comfort that our results reflect a real phenomenon and not an 
artifact of our particular sample or methodological choices.13 In Panel B of Table 5, we again 
estimate an F-test of joint equality on LogGovSales and LogPrivSales. Unlike in Table 4, we are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis when our model includes firm fixed effects. The inability to 
reject the null in Table 5 Panel B may arise from the firm fixed effects absorbing variation of 
interest, but we cannot make a definitive statement.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
 In addition to correlated omitted variables, it is possible that lagged values of the covariates 
specified in equation (1) are correlated with the error term. If strict exogeneity is violated, then the 
estimators reported in Table 4 may be biased.14 To mitigate this concern, we employed Arellano 
 
13 For parsimony, we omit discussion of controls variables in sensitivity analyses. 
14 We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention. 




Bond estimators; Arellano Bond estimators are a GMM estimator that is appropriate when lagged 
covariates are plausibly correlated with the error term in dynamic panel data. Rather than taking a 
simple first-difference, the Arellano Bond estimator combines both differences and levels to 
restore the assumption of strict exogeneity.  To implement the Arellano Bond estimators, we took 
the first-difference of equation (1) to eliminate individual effects then used three lags of LogR&D 
to instrument for differenced lags of the potentially endodenous dependent variable.15 The results 
of the Arellano Bond estimator are reported in Table 6 Panel A. The coefficients on LogGovSales 
and LogPrivSales remain positive and significant (coefficients=0.1086 and 0.1215, p-
values=0.000 and 0.000, respectively), giving some comfort that endogeneity does not explain the 
previously documented positive association between government contracting and firm-specific 
innovation. Similar to Table 5 Panel B, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of the 
equivalence of LogGovSales and LogPrivSales with respect to LogR&D in Table 6 Panel B.   
 
Table 6 about here 
 
 
5.0 Measuring the Intensity of Government Relative to Private-Sector R&D 
 
Do certain firms innovate more on their government relative to private-sector contracts? 
Does the intensity of government relative to private R&D correspond with the uniqueness of the 
firm’s products? That is to say, do firms that produce fighter jets innovate more than firms that 
supply cans of soda? To answer these questions, we use equation (1) to create an empirical 
measure of predicted R&D on government contracts, scaled by predicted R&D on non-
government contracts. Of course, this measure applies only to firms with both government and 
commercial business.  
  
 To begin, we use the estimated coefficients on LogGovSales and LagLogGovSales [b8 
and b9) from equation (1)] to generate a forecast of the firm’s investment in R&D for its next 
dollar of government contracts (which we call ForGovR&D). Because government sales are 
 
15 Our STATA estimation also used three lags for all control variables except LogR&D^2, for which we used two 
lags. 




volatile, we estimate ForGovR&D for every firm-year in our contractor sample and take the 
average value over the sample period to generate one fitted value per firm.  
   
ForGovR&Di,t =  b8LogGovSalesi,t + b9LagLogGovSalesi,t-1  (2) 
 
 Similarly, we use the estimated betas from the coefficients for private sector sales and 
generate a forecast of incremental R&D on the firm’s private contracts (ForPrivR&D).  
 
ForPrivR&Di,t =  b10LogPrivSalesi,t + b11LagLogPrivSalesi,t-1   (3) 
  
Dividing the firm-specific result of equation (2) by equation (3) generates a measure of 
R&D intensity of government contracts relative to private sales. A high value of (2)/(3) indicates 
the firm innovates more on its government contracts relative to private sales; a low ratio suggests 
the opposite. We use our measure of R&D intensity to rank firms and industries on government 
relative to commercial innovation and believe the measure has potential for subsequent studies.  
 
After calculating R&D intensity for all the firms in the contractor sample, we sort firms 
into the highest and lowest ratios. Table 7 Panel A (Panel B) contains the ratio and NAICS three-
digit industry for the ten firms with the most (least) innovation on government relative to private 
contracts. We also report the product the firm provides to the government on its largest contract 
(taken from usaspending.gov).  We expect R&D intensity to be high for firms who provide 
scarce products to the government and low for firms that provide commodities. For example, 
Raytheon and Lockheed Martin (in the top ten firms) provide air missile and defense systems 
and R&D, while Sentry Technology (Panel B, bottom ten firms) provides painting. Presumably, 
producers of missiles and defense systems innovate more than contractors who paint the 
government’s buildings, so Panels A and B support our new measure’s validity.  
 
To further validate our meaure, we expand our analysis to sub-industries. Specifically, we 
calculate R&D intensity for three-digit NAICS containing at least ten firms and average each 
constituent firm’s measure of R&D on government relative to private contracts to obtain an 
industry average.  We report this analysis in Panel C of Table 7. For each sub-industry, we 




randomly select one firm and collect the representative government product from the firm’s 
largest government contract on usaspending.gov. As we intuitively expect, industries with high 
R&D intensity produce products like avionics (NAICS 334) and low-ratio industries purvey less 
customizable goods such as lodging (531). Imagine our surprise to observe that NAICS 336 
(Transportation Equipment Manufacturing) ranks relatively low in R&D intensity. 
Representative products in this industry include aircraft. Evaluating the optimal level of 
innovation required in aircraft relative to consulting services is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but we sincerely hope suppliers in this industry apply whatever innovation they possess to 
commercial airliners.   
 




In 2016, U.S. Federal government contracts totaled $460 billion or about two percent of 
gross domestic product. The government is uniquely powerful in its ability to extract concessions 
from and enforce punishments against firms with whom it conducts business. When Uncle Sam 
goes shopping, he enjoys virtually limitless bargaining power. Despite the enormity of 
government spending and the fathomless depths of Federal power over suppliers, we know 
surprisingly little about how government acquisitions affect private-sector partner behavior, 
including innovation.  As the American economy increasingly rewards innovative firms, firms 
face ever-mounting pressures to invest in future growth through strategic research and 
development. Our paper adds to a growing body of literature on the association between Federal 
acquisitions via contracting and firms’ investment in innovation.  
 
Using a sample comprised of both contractor and non-contractor firms, we analyze whether 
firms’ R&D expenditures vary with the extent of sales to the government. We find that 
government sales positively predict firm-level R&D; this result is robust to sensitivity analyses 
including firm fixed effects and Arellano Bond estimation. However, the effect of government 
relative to private contracts on R&D is sensitive to the empirical specification, so we are unable 
to draw inferences regarding whether the demand on government contracts differs from that on 




non-government, private contracts. Additionally, we develop a novel measure of R&D intensity 
that allows us to rank individual contractors and entire industries on the relative importance of 
public and private sector innovation. This measure is simple to calculate and displays construct 
validity. We hope fellow researchers find it useful. 
 
Why do government sales share a positive association with investment in R&D? Is this effect 
more pronounced in certain firms? Are there circumstances under which government and private 
sales do differ in their impact on firm innovation? These queries represent a natural extension of 
our results and would shed much-needed light on the relatively underexplored impact of 
acquisitions on our country’s collective innovativness. 
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Appendix A.  Variable Definitions 
 
Variable                                        Definition (source in parentheses) 
Year   A series of dummy variables for year; 2009 excluded (Compustat) 
 
Age The number of years since firm i first appeared in Compustat as of year t 
(Compustat) 
 
HiTech A dummy equal to one if the contractor is in a high technology industry; zero 
otherwise (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016) 
 
MVE The firm’s total shares outstanding multiplied by closing price per share, scaled 
by total assets (Compustat: prcc_f*csho/at) 
  
R&D Research and development expense for firm i  in year t scaled by total assets 
(Compustat: xrd/at) 
 
LagR&D Research and development expense for firm i in year t-1, scaled by total   
  assets (Compustat) 
 
LagR&D^2 Squared research and development expense for firm i in year t-1, scaled   
  by total assets (Compustat) 
 
Cash  Operating cash flows for firm i in year t, scaled by total assets   
  (Compustat: oancf/at) 
 
LagCash Operating cash flows for firm i in year t-1, scaled by total assets (Compustat) 
 
GovSales Total sales to the federal government for firm i in year t scaled by total sales 
(usaspending.gov and Compustat: government sales/sales) 
 
LagGovSales Total sales to the federal government for firm i in year t-1 scaled by total sales 
(usaspending.gov and Compustat) 
 
PrivSales For non-contractors, total sales for firm i in year t-1 scaled by total assets  
(Compustat: sales/at). For government contractors, total sales for firm i in year t 
less government sales, scaled by total sales (usaspending.gov and Compustat: 
(sales-govsales)/sales)) 
 
LagPrivSales For non-contractors, total sales for firm i in year t-1 scaled by total assets.   
  For government contractors, total sales for firm i in year t-1 less    
  government sales, scaled by total sales (usaspending.gov and Compustat) 
 
Log  The natural logarithm of (variable plus one).  





Table 1. The Sample 
Panel A. Sample Creation 
 
A.  Compustat information for both contractor and private firms  
 
      Observations 
Compustat annual file    83,329 
Less missing controls 
Less missing lags     
Total Observations    28,065 
 
B. Usaspending.gov contractor information 
usaspending.gov    40,000,000* 
Less missing controls 
Combined into firm-years 
Number of observations    3,000,000* 
*Contract data files are large. * indicates an approximation.     
 
C. Contractor firms, intersection of  A. and B.   
Number of Observations   2,248 / 714 unique firms 
 
D. Non-contractor control firms, A. minus C. 
Initial Set     25,817 
After Propensity Score Matching  1,737 / 1,159 unique firms.  
     
Panel B.  Observations by year 
 
Year   Contractors Non-Contractors Total 
2009   492  277   769 
2010   474  373   847 
2011   221  187   408 
2012   225  187   412 
2013   220  188   408 
2014   215  185   400 
2015   221  182   403 
2016   180  158   338 
 
Total   2,248  1,737   3,985 











Table 2.  Logit Regression on Government Contractor Dummy after Propensity Score 
Matching (n = 3,985) 
 
  Variable  Coefficient 
     (p-value ) 
 
 Constant  1.3168** 
    (0.042)  
 
 Age   1.0029    
    (0.203)     
 
 HiTech  0.9554    
    (0.562)     
 
 LogMVE  0.9121    
    (0.193)     
     
 LagLogR&D  1.7436        
                (0.339)     
   
LagLogR&D^2 1.0453*   
   (0.072)  
 
LogCash  1.2022    
(0.418)    
 
LagLogCash  0.5990*  
   (0.077) 
 
  LogPrivSales  0.8056   
(0.443)     
 
LagLogPrivSales 1.1095    
   (0.717)     
 
Pseudo R2  0.0036 













Table 3. Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A. Contractors (n=2,248 firm-years) and non-contractors (n=1,737) 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
 
Age    
 Contractor    28.314  15.462  3 16 24 45 55  
 Non-Contractor  27.685 15.344  2 15 24 42 55 
 
HiTech    
 Contractor  0.7482 0.4341  0 0 1 1 1  
 Non-Contractor  0.7478 0.4344  0 0 1 1 1 
 
MVE   
 Contractor  1.6161 1.5942  0.0015 0.7165 1.1911 1.9911 25.387 
 Non-Contractor  4.9460 105.83  0.0058 0.7080 1.1493 1.9294 4347.6 
 
R&D    
 Contractor  0.0713 0.0928  0 0.0175 0.0451 0.0931 0.8921 
 Non-Contractor  0.0683 0.1117  0 0.0087 0.0323 0.0937 2.0331 
 
LagR&D    
 Contractor  0.0713 0.0928  0 0.0175 0.0451 0.0932 0.8921 
 Non-Contractor  0.0681 0.1114  0 0.0086 0.0322 0.0937 2.0331 
 
LagR&D^2  
 Contractor  0.0007 0.0062  0 4.1E-8 1.5E-6 2.4E-5 0.1913  
 Non-Contractor  0.0076 0.1786  0 1.4E-8 4.9E-7 1.9E-4 6.9000 
 
Cash   
 Contractor  0.0648 0.1432  -0.9610 0.0409 0.0876 0.1304 0.8500 
 Non-Contractor  0.0719 0.1591  -0.9377 0.0383 0.0903 0.1369 0.3257 
 
LagCash   
 Contractor  0.0649 0.1431  -0.9610 0.0409 0.0876 0.1304 0.8500 
 Non-Contractor  0.0723 0.1586  -0.9377 0.0383 0.0904 0.1370 1.7500 
 
PrivSales 
 Contractor  0.8832 0.5540  0.0025 0.5444 0.7590 1.0718 5.3100  
 Non-Contractor  0.9402 0.7229  0 0.5276 0.7894 1.1822 9.4508 
 
LagPrivSales 
 Contractor  67.456 1271.9  1.1E-6 0.4461 0.7317 1.2726 50689 












Table 3. Continued 
Panel B. Contractors only (n=2,248) 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
 
 
GovSales   0.0390 0.1378  0 0.0002 0.0024 0.0137 2.2639 
  










































Table 4. Panel A. OLS Regression of Logged R&D on Logged Government Sales and 
Controls (n = 3,985) 
 
  Variable  Coefficient 
     (p-value ) 
 
 Constant  0.0059 
    (0.190)  
 
 Age   -0.0002    
    (0.132)     
 
 HiTech  0.0073**    
    (0.025)     
 
 LogMVE  -0.0005    
    (0.933)     
     
 LagLogR&D  0.8314***       
                (0.000)     
   
LagLogR&D^2 0.0024   
   (0.205)  
 
LogCash  -0.0865***    
(0.000)    
 
LagLogCash  0.0485***  
   (0.000) 
 
 LogGovSales  0.0747***    
    (0.000)     
 
 LagLogGovSales -0.0836***     
   (0.000)     
 
  LogPrivSales  0.1213***    
(0.000)     
 
LagLogPrivSales -0.1128***     
   (0.000)     
 
Adjusted R2  0.8336    
 




Year dummy coefficients not reported; ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at <0.001, 0.05, and 0.10, 
respectively. Standard errors are robust. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
  




Table 4. Panel B. F-Test of Joint Equality of Coefficients on LogGovSales and LogPrivSales 
with Respect to LogR&D 
   
    
F(1, 3966)  11.00 
Prob > F  0.0009  












































Table 5. Panel A. OLS Regression of Logged R&D on Logged Government Sales and 
Controls with Firm Fixed Effects (n = 3,190) 
 
  Variable  Coefficient 
     (p-value ) 
 
 Constant  -0.0014 
    (0.876)  
 
 Age   -0.0065***    
    (0.000)     
 
 HiTech  -0.0022    
    (0.794)     
 
 LogMVE  0.0132***    
    (0.001)     
     
 LagLogR&D  0.3080***       
                (0.000)     
   
LagLogR&D^2 0.0143***   
   (0.001)  
 
LogCash  -0.0828***    
(0.000)    
 
LagLogCash  -0.0038  
   (0.799) 
 
 LogGovSales  0.0766***    
    (0.000)     
 
 LagLogGovSales -0.0114     
   (0.356)     
 
  LogPrivSales  0.0963***    
(0.000)     
 
LagLogPrivSales -0.0285***     
   (0.006)     
 
Adjusted R2  0.9467   
 
Year dummy coefficients not reported; ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at <0.001, 0.05, and 0.10, 
respectively. Standard errors are robust. Variables are defined in Appendix A 





Table 5. Panel B. F-Test of Joint Equality of Coefficients on LogGovSales and LogPrivSales 
with Respect to LogR&D 
   
    
F(1, 2282)  1.88 













































Table 6. Panel A. Arellano Bond Regression of Logged R&D on Logged Government 
 Sales and Controls, Three Lags, No Constant (n = 565) 
 
  Variable  Coefficient 
     (p-value ) 
 
 LogMVE  0.0044    
    (0.359)     
     
 LagLogR&D  0.2923 
                (0.146)     
   
LagLogR&D^2 -0.0108   
   (0.142)  
 
LogCash  -0.0802***    
(0.000)    
 
LagLogCash  -0.0264  
   (0.168) 
 
 LogGovSales  0.1086***    
    (0.000)     
 
 LagLogGovSales -0.0131     
   (0.441)     
 
  LogPrivSales  0.1215***    
(0.000)     
 
LagLogPrivSales -0.0043     
   (0.835)     
 
Wald Chi2(27) 127.22 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  
  
 
 Group variable is firm ID (GVKEY); time variable is fiscal year. ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at  













Table 6. Continued 
Panel B. F-Test of Joint Equality of Coefficients on LogGovSales and LogPrivSales with 
Respect to LogR&D 
   
    
Chi2(1)  1.82 


































Table 7.  Ratio of Forecast Government R&D to Forecast Private-Sector R&D 
Panel A. Ratio of Forecast Government R&D to Forecast Private-Sector R&D for the Top 
Ten Contractors 
 
Company Name Three-Digit NAICS Ratio of Forecast 





Raytheon 334 223.27 Air and Missile Defense 
Systems 
Lockheed Martin 336 5.9533 Defense R&D 
Optical Cable Corp 335 5.2355 Optical Wire 
Manufacturing 
Quantum Corp 334 4.5361 Defense R&D 
American Biomedical 
Corp 
325 3.8818 Surgical Appliances 
Cubic Corp 333 3.0873 General R&D 
MCS Industrial 423 2.6557 HVAC Design 
Theragenics Corp 339 2.0329 Medical Instruments 
Textron Inc 336 1.6928 Shipbuilding 


































Table 7. Panel B. Ratio of Forecast Government R&D to Forecast Private-Sector R&D for 
the Bottom Ten Contractors 
 
 
Company Name Three-Digit NAICS Ratio of Forecast 





Liberty Property Trust 531 -44.911 Lease Management 
Fresenius Medical Care 621 -14.200 Kidney Dialysis 
General Dynamics 336 -9.1192 Engineering Services 
Electromed 334 -8.2084 Surgical Supplies 
NVE  334 -7.8647 Security Guards 
Law Enforcement 
Associates 
334 -6.7812 Equipment Repair 
Unisys 541 -5.9371 Computer System Design 
Aware 511 -5.1905 Software Publishing 
Axion  335 -4.1335 Plate Work 


































Table 7. Panel C.  Representative Sub-Industry Descriptions, Products, and Average Ratio 
of Forecast Government R&D to Forecast Private-Sector R&D for Sub-Industries with at 





Sub-Industry Description Number of Firms 
in Sub-Industry 







334 Computer and Electronic 
Product Manufacturing 
166 1.2271 Avionics 
423 Merchant Wholesalers, 
Durable Goods 
13 0.2416 Motor Vehicle Parts 
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 43 0.2398 Medical Machines 
335 Electrical Equipment, 
Appliance, and Component 
Manufacturing 





54 0.0668 Rough Terrain 
Forklifts 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 74 0.0366 Alternative Fuels 
541 Professional, Scientific, and 
Technical Services 
29 -0.0346 Consulting 
519 
Other Information Services 
13 -0.0804 Television 
Programming 
336 Transportation Equipment 
Manufacturing 
27 -0.1580 Aircraft, Tanks 
511 Publishing Industries (except 
Internet) 
51 -0.1592 Database Access 
517 
Telecommunications 
11 -0.1749 Satellite 
Communications 
621 Ambulatory Health Care 
Services 
13 -1.1904 Ambulance Services 
531 Real Estate 24 -1.9791 Lodging 
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